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*email: sdreyer@uw.edu As climate policies change through the legislative process, public attitudes towards them may change as well. Therefore, it is important to assess how people accept and support controversial climate policies as the policies change over time. Policy acceptance is a positive evaluation of, or attitude towards, an existing policy [1] [2] [3] ; policy support adds an active behavioural component 1, 3 . Acceptance does not necessarily lead to support. We conducted a national survey of Australian residents to investigate acceptance of, and support for, the Australian carbon pricing policy before and after the 2013 federal election, and how perceptions of the policy, economic ideology, and voting behaviour affect acceptance and support. We found acceptance and support were stable across the election period, which was surprising given that climate policy was highly contentious during the election. Policy acceptance was higher than policy support at both times and acceptance was a necessary but insufficient condition of support. We conclude that acceptance is an important process through which perceptions of the policy and economic ideology influence support.
Therefore, future climate policy research needs to distinguish between acceptance and support to better understand this process, and to better measure these concepts.
The acceptability of an environmental policy usually increases between planning and implementation [4] [5] [6] . This pattern is also evident in controversial health policies such as smoking restrictions 7 , but is not well established in the climate policy literature, where researchers have measured acceptability, acceptance, and/or support for climate policies only at single time points 1, 8 .
Increased acceptance and support may be due to increased familiarity 9, 10 with the policy or the realization that prior anxieties regarding perceived negative outcomes of the policy were unfulfilled 4 .
The role elections play in changing policy support and acceptance is poorly understood. We examined changes in support for, and acceptance of, Australia's carbon pricing policy using data collected a fortnight before and a fortnight after the 2013 federal election. The policy was a heated topic of debate during the election campaign. Regardless of familiarity processes, changes in carbon policy support and acceptance may reflect or drive changes in the government, but the literature does not lend itself to any firm hypothesis. If the newly elected government had sought to overturn an existing policy as part of its election platform, we may expect support and acceptance to diminish. If the incumbent government, which had introduced the policy, were re-elected, we may expect support and acceptance to increase. Many processes may account for such changes. People may alter their views to align with newly discovered population norms 11 , they may seek to resolve cognitive dissonance arising from differences between their views and the new status quo 12, 13 , or their views may become stronger because of greater perceived consensus for their own views 11 .
Policy acceptability, acceptance and support have been used interchangeably within the literature, but represent distinct constructs [1] [2] [3] . Disagreement also exists within the policy and renewable energy technology (RET) literature regarding the definition of these constructs. Some authors distinguish among these terms on an attitudinal/behavioural dimension 1-3,14 but, even so, do not agree which terms correspond to attitudes and which to behaviours. Acceptability has been said to correspond to attitudes and acceptance to behaviour 14 ; conversely, acceptance to attitudes and support to behaviours 1-3 . Also, the terms have been distinguished temporally (that is, before (acceptability) and after (acceptance) implementation), while being unaligned with the attitudinal/behavioural dimension 15 . Different types of RET acceptance have also been proposedsocio-political acceptance, market acceptance, and community acceptance 16 .
Research measuring acceptance and support as distinct constructs shows that levels of regulations seeking to minimize negative market externalities (greenhouse gas emissions).
In Australia, climate action has been heatedly debated, with both Labor and Liberal governments advancing and regressing action [19] [20] [21] . The Clean Energy Legislative Package (CELP, also known as the carbon pricing policy, or inaccurately but more commonly as the carbon tax) was We investigated whether the 2013 Australian federal election affected levels of acceptance and support for the Australian carbon policy. The carbon Policy was a key election issue, with different carbon policy outcomes depending on the election results. We measured acceptance and support of the carbon policy two weeks before (Time 1-T1 and two weeks after (Time 2-T2) the election through an online questionnaire distributed to a national sample of the Australian residents. We tested the following hypotheses: acceptance will be higher than support; acceptance and support will change between T1 and T2; and acceptance is necessary precondition of support
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(as one must accept a policy to support it).
At both T1 and T2, policy acceptance was significantly higher than support Table 1 ). Although acceptance and support levels varied predictably with the political party voted for, the basic findings of higher levels of acceptance than support and lack of change over time were consistent across party choice (see Table 1 and Methods for complete analysis).
Using hierarchical multiple regression analyses for T2 respondents (N=785), we tested whether perceived effectiveness, perceived fairness and FMI (all centred at the mean; entered on
Step 1) and the interactions among these variables (entered on
Step 2) predicted policy acceptance or support (see Table 2 and Methods for information on covariates, which did not impact the regression). Only the main effects were significant in these models (Acceptance:
Step 1 adjusted R 2 =0.77, F(3,781)=873.65, p < 0.001; Support:
Step 1 adjusted R 2 =0.69, F(3,781)=571.03, p < 0.001).
As predicted, greater perceived fairness and effectiveness were associated with increased acceptance and support of the policy, whereas greater FMI was and support of the policy (see Table   2 ). The addition of the interaction terms on Step 2 of these analyses failed to increase the amount of variance explained in either model (Δ 2 = 0.00, Δ 2 = 0.00; although one interaction term (fairness * effectiveness) in the support model was significant, it failed to significantly increase the variance explained).
To examine our hypothesis that acceptance is a necessary precondition for support, we first − cross-tabulated the distributions of acceptance and support among all participants at T2 (Methods A cross-lagged correlation analysis 23 bolsters this conclusion: there was a significant difference between the correlation of acceptance at T1 with support at T2 (controlling for support at T1) and support at T1 and acceptance at T2 (controlling for acceptance at T1; r 's=0.32 and 0.17 respectively;
z=2.10, p< 0.05), suggesting acceptance precedes support (see Methods for details).
We further tested whether acceptance is a necessary precondition of support with a mediation analysis using AMOS with bootstrap estimation of the indirect effects (5,000 samples) among all respondents at T2. As shown in Fig. 1 , we specified acceptance as the mediator and support as the Although we have identified one important process, there may be others, not measured here, that should be explored. To do so, future climate policy research needs to measure acceptance and support as distinct constructs while investigating other variables. Furthermore, those who do not support the policy do not necessarily oppose it. Future research should attempt to disentangle opposition from lack of support, ambivalence from apathy, and 'rejection' from 'resistance' 24 .
Our second major conclusion relates to the stability of acceptance and support for Australia's proposed carbon pricing policy during a significant electoral upheaval where climate policy was an important area of contention. The lack of change was independent of party choice. Possibly, the stability of acceptance and support are related to the ambiguity around policy alternatives.
Participants at T2 may have known that Abbott would try to repeal the CELP and institute the Direct Action Plan, but they would not have known the specifics of the alternative, as they were not released until after the survey.
Evaluation of the acceptance or support of a current policy should happen in a comparative policy context rather than in isolation from competing policy options. A limitation of our study is that we were unable to assess support and acceptability of the Direct Action Plan, and its perceived fairness and effectiveness, as the policy details were unknown at the time of the study and hence could not be included. The more fair and effective a policy is perceived to be, the more likely it is to be accepted and supported, therefore participation and/or procedural justice (a type of fairness) may be a key concern 25, 26 for future climate action. Research in many sustainability domains has considered the important role of participation, such as in planning and decisionmaking in renewable energy technology 24 , for sustainability science and community-based participatory research 27 , and in the implementation of European climate targets 28 . The CELP was specifically designed to address distributive justice issues via the household compensation plan; as such, we measured the distributive justice aspects of fairness in our study. Future studies should address participation and procedural justice concerns, if they are applicable for the climate policy.
Some policy-implementation implications arising from our study include the importance of ensuring public acceptance to undergird support. This can be done by, for example, communicating normative information 29, 30 -in Australia, the carbon pricing legislation was not as 9 unpopular as many, especially on the conservative side of Australian politics claimed, with nearly half of the population finding the policy acceptable and providing further evidence of pluralistic ignorance 11 . However, that level of acceptance did not translate into effective support through the election. Clearly, policy acceptance does not equate to support (although it does mediate it), especially in contested arenas such as elections, where many issues are conflated into a single electoral point.
Methods
We used a within-subjects online survey experiment to investigate changes in support and acceptance before (T1) and after (T2) In addition, we used between-subjects design to measure testing bias. Testing bias was assessed to ensure that participating in the survey before the election did not influence the responses of those same participants (within-subjects) after the election. Post-election results from an independent sample taken at T2 were compared against the within-subjects sample at T2 and no significant differences were found on measures of acceptance or support (p's > 0.05), indicating there were no testing effects for our online survey.
For T1, we sent 14,500 invites via email within the panel. Of these, 1,551 respondents clicked the link from their computers, resulting in a 48.8% cooperation rate, and 5.3% response rate. For T2 we recontacted the 772 T1 participants and recruited new participants. At T2, N=785 (388 males, 397 females); 516 were T1 participants and 269 were new participants. There was a 72.6% cooperation rate;
66.8% response rate within the T1 sample (772 invites sent, 711 click-ins), and a 55% cooperation rate;
5.7% response rate for those who were new at T2 (4,700 invites sent, 489 click-ins).
Questionnaires differed slightly for T1 and T2, reflecting prior consent and the recent change in government. Our measures are described below (see Supplementary Information for questionnaire). Our method is, in part, based on past work 1 , but improves on certain limitations by utilizing the same response format to measure multiple items for acceptance and support. In addition, our analytical approach differs from that past work. Unless noted, items were measured on five-point response scales.
Free-market ideology (FMI).
We measured FMI using the FMI scale in ref.
18 (see Supplementary Information), presenting items in random order to each participant. Responses were coded so a higher score aligned with endorsement of a FMI.
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Policy acceptance and support.
To ensure participants had a basic policy knowledge, the survey included a brief summary of the carbon policy taken from the government website. Next, acceptance and support items were randomly presented to each participant, along with the fairness and effectiveness items. The acronym CELP is used here for brevity, but was spelt out within questionnaire items.
We Perceived fairness and effectiveness.
Perceived fairness and effectiveness were each measured by two items: 'How fair do you think it is that some big industries now must pay for the carbon they emit, as mandated by the carbon pricing policy?', How fair do you think the compensation plan is for those affected by increased costs due to the carbon price?', 'How effective do you think the carbon pricing policy will be to help lower carbon emissions from industries in Australia?', 'How effective do you think the compensation plan is in reducing the financial impact of the carbon price on individuals?'. The two items for each measure were strongly correlated with each other (T1: r eff= 0.65, r fair =0.54; T2: r eff =0.65, r fair =0.49; p's < 0.01), supporting our decision to take the average of the two items as our measures of fairness and effectiveness.
Higher numbers indicate greater fairness/effectiveness.
Voting preferences and behaviour.
At Additionally, there was an 'I don't know' category at T1.
Demographics.
We assessed gender, income, age and education. Six response categories were included for income, varying from '0-$18,200' to '$180,001 and over.' These categories were chosen to replicate the cutoff points for the compensation package within the carbon policy, based on household did not support the policy, and 30.2% were neutral or ambivalent. These findings were further supported by significant mean differences between acceptance and support for both time periods (Table 1) . As hypothesized, participants showed greater acceptance than support of the policy at T1
(t(515)=9.68, p< 0.001) and T2 (t(515)=11.64, p< 0.001). Both acceptance and support were stable across the election time: a repeated-measures ANOVA showed no significant change in acceptance or support from T1 to T2, (p's > 0.05).
Covariates.
Preliminary regression analyses for covariates revealed that age and gender were not significantly related to support or acceptance-and were therefore dropped from subsequent analyses. Education and income were significant predictors of acceptance (b=0.14, p< 0.01; b= -0. Cross-lagged correlations.
Owing to high zero-order correlation between the acceptance and support at both time periods, we computed cross-lagged correlations on the residuals 23, 31 . In effect, we used the correlation between acceptance at T1 with support at T2, while controlling for support at T1 (r acc1supp2.supp1 ) and the correlation between support at T1 and acceptance at T2, while controlling for acceptance at T1
(r supp1acc2.acc1 ), along with the two synchronous correlations of the residuals (r acc1supp1 and r acc2supp2 ), and the two autocorrelations of the residuals (racc1acc2 and rsupp1supp2 ) to test the equality of the cross-lagged correlations 23 using our within-subjects sample (N 516 Figure 1 Path model. This model shows acceptance mediating the effects of FMI, effectiveness and fairness with standardized regression estimates. The curved lines indicate covariance and associated correlation. All paths are significant, p's<0.01.
